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Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal regime governing 
counterclaims in investor-State disputes.  It challenges the frequent presumption that the right 
to assert counterclaims is hindered by the fact that investment treaties impose no obligations 
on foreign investors and only protect their rights.  The paper demonstrates that the right to 
assert counterclaims is a procedural right, and subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims 
depends on whether the investor has breached obligations found in applicable law. The paper 
shows that foreign investors’ substantive obligations can be found in sources of international 
law other than investment treaties.  The paper also highlights the difficulties of asserting 
counterclaims in non-commercial areas such as human rights and environmental protection. 
Finally, it also shows that tribunals may pierce the corporate veil of foreign investors in the 
context of counterclaims. 
 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Although foreign investors now enjoy the right to sue States in international 
tribunals, States rarely assert counterclaims to address investors' misconduct.  This 
paper discusses why this is the case and deals with the main legal problems arising 
out of counterclaims in investor-state arbitration.  
Foreign investments dramatically grew in the twentieth century and became 
the main cause and manifestation of globalisation.1  According to an almost 
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universal consensus foreign investments benefit investors and host countries.2  
Cross-border investment flows improve the long-term efficiency of the host 
country. They stimulate greater competition, transferring capital, technology, and 
managerial skills, and create new jobs.3  Foreign investors also benefit from their 
access to new markets, cheaper natural resources, and labour force.4  
To facilitate foreign investments States conclude international investment 
treaties. According to UNCTAD, states concluded over 2,500 bilateral investment 
treaties, as well as numerous regional and multilateral agreements, which regulate 
foreign investments.5  On the domestic level, governments across the globe adopt 
very similar approaches to legal regulation of treatment of private foreign 
investment.  The standards include rules of entry, guarantees against 
expropriation, general standards of treatment, and procedures for the settlement 
of disputes.6 
Nearly all investment treaties provide for arbitration to resolve investment 
disputes. Typically, investors have a choice between submitting disputes to ICSID 
or to an ad-hoc tribunal established under the rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).7  Other treaties may also 
provide for dispute resolution before other arbitral institutions, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in Paris, 
and London Court of International Arbitration.8   
The most distinctive feature of the system of investor-state disputes is that it 
firmly establishes the capacity of private persons – either individuals or 
corporations – to submit a claim against a state without intervention of their 
respective national governments. This has made investment disputes from a purely 
political into international law issue, which generally facilitates faster and more 
efficient resolution of disputes.  Up to this day, the Convention is regarded as one 
of the most important treaties to recognises individuals as subjects of international 
law.9 Clearly, the system benefits investors who gain an independent right to 
initiate dispute settlement directly against the host state instead of forcing them to 
                                                                                                                                       
1 See, eg, G. Garrett, The Causes of Globalization, Comparative Political Studies (2000) 33 (6/7) 941, 
944-947; FDI in figures, July 2011 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/43/48462282.pdf>. 
2 See, eg, OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2002.) 
3 ibid, 10-18.  
4 ibid.  
5 UNCTAD, Investment Agreements Monitor No. 3 (2009): Recent developments in international investment 
agreements (2008-June 2009) (Geneva: United Nations Commission on Trade and Development), 3.   
6 See, eg, UNCTAD, ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (IIA Issues Note, No1, 
11 March), 1-3 at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20113_en.pdf>.  
7 See, eg, Argentina-United States: Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and. Protection of 
Investment, Washington, November 14, 1991 (1992) 31 ILM 124, Art VII.  
8 See, eg, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government of  the 
Kingdom of Denmark on encouragement and mutual protection of investments, dated March 31, 2004, 
Art 9.  
9 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 10. 
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rely either on dispute resolution in domestic courts or on interstate dispute 
resolution.10 
However, the system also provides for the right to submit counterclaims. 
Counterclaims make investor-state dispute resolution more efficient and facilitate 
equality of the parties but present a number of particular legal problems. This 
paper explains that it is often difficult to establish obligations of investors vis-à-vis 
the host State.  Most investor-state disputes arise out of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) concluded with the purpose of protecting foreign investors in host 
States.  BITs usually do not articulate the rights of States, and States tend to rely 
on their domestic judiciary to resolve disputes with foreign investors.  Moreover, 
interpreting BITs in the light of their purpose of protecting investors creates an 
additional constraint for jurisdiction over counterclaims.  
BITs usually do not regulate non-commercial aspects of investors' activities in 
areas such as human rights or protection of environment.  As a result, investor-
state tribunals are reluctant to broaden their subject-matter jurisdiction to non-
commercial areas.  Moreover, undercapitalised local subsidiaries often appear as 
claimants in arbitral proceedings.  Because of separation of corporate entities, it is 
difficult to obtain and enforce arbitral awards against properly capitalised parent 
companies.  Counterclaims against undercapitalised subsidiaries make little sense, 
and tribunals are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil of such companies. 
The paper suggests that these constraints are not fatal to the States’ right to 
assert counterclaims against foreign investors.  The right to counterclaim is a 
procedural right provided by all major arbitration rules such as ICSID, 
UNCITRAL, or ICC.  Although BITs are typically concluded in the interests of 
investors, they usually provide for broad jurisdiction over disputes ‘concerning an 
investment’ and do not restrict the parties’ obligations to those contained in the 
BITs.  Obligations of investors arise out of applicable law, which is either 
stipulated in the BIT or determined by the investor-state tribunal. 
It is demonstrated that investors’ obligations may arise under sources of 
international law other than BITs, such as general principles of law or secondary 
sources of international law such as case law and scholarly writings.  With certain 
reservations, relevant investors’ obligations can also be found in contracts of 
investors with States.  Tribunals may also pierce the corporate veil of local 
undercapitalised subsidiaries to ensure procedural equality between the State and 
the foreign investor.  
The paper is structured as follows:  The next part gives an overview of legal 
rules and practice of asserting counterclaims by States under major procedural 
rules used in investor-state disputes such as United-States Iran Claims Tribunal, 
ICSID, and UNCITRAL.  Part III sets out the main problems related to consent 
of investors to counterclaims.  Most importantly, it explains why the procedural 
right to assert counterclaims is not hindered by the fact that BITs do not contain 
                                                     
10 C. Brower and S. Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law?’ (2008-2009) 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 471, 476.  
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investors’ obligations.  Part IV suggests that substantive obligations of investors 
can be found in other sources of international law, and with certain reservations, 
in investor-state contracts.  Part V concludes.  
 
 
 
II PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ASSERTING COUNTERCLAIMS 
 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES AND COUNTERCLAIMS  
 
Counterclaims are claims submitted by the party different from the one which 
requested the institution of the proceedings.  Since investors initiate nearly all 
investor-State disputes,11 counterclaims are typically submitted by host States.  
There are a number of reasons to allow counterclaims in investor-State disputes.  
First, counterclaims facilitate more equality between the parties.  Although 
BITs are inherently asymmetrical and provide investors with rights but not 
obligations, States can initiate and submit counterclaims.12  Second, counterclaims 
arising from separate but related agreements between the parties would enhance 
efficiency of dispute resolution.  It would be preferable and less time-consuming 
to resolve all disputes in one set of proceedings.  Given the high cost of resolving 
disputes in international arbitration,13 this reason is particularly important for less 
developed countries. Successful counterclaims may also deter frivolous claims and 
provide the State with motive to bypass jurisdictional objectives. 
Third, counterclaims may be in the interest of the host State for other 
reasons.  For instance, recourse to arbitration offers superior international 
enforcement prospects compared to domestic court judgments.  ICSID arbitration 
awards do not require any recognition or enforcement; State parties to the ICSID 
Convention are obligated to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State.14  
Most other awards, such as rendered under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, can be 
enforced under the 1958 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).   
In addition, an award of an international tribunal may appear truly neutral and 
be better for the country’s reputation.  It may be well within the best interests of 
                                                     
11 See ICSID, ‘The ICSID Caseload - Statistics 2011-1’ at <http://icsid.worldbank.org>. 
12 See, eg, ‘Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States’, Art 13 (as amended 10 April 2006) [ICSID Convention], 18 March 1965 at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/Rulesmain.jsp>: ‘The convention permits the institution of 
proceedings by host States as well as by investors and the executive directors have constantly had in mind 
that the provisions of the convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both cases.’ 
13 For instance, in Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, the legal costs to the 
claimant (related to both the jurisdiction and merits phases of the arbitration), amounted to $4.6 million, 
while the respondent’s legal costs (for both phases) were $13.2 million.  
14 ICSID Convention, n 12 above, Art 54.1.  
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investors to encourage counterclaims because investors would have all their 
disputes resolved in a neutral forum rather than a local court.15 
There is also a fairness argument.  Many suggest that foreign investors often 
have economic muscle that can hardly be surpassed by many host States.16  Today 
some multinational enterprises have budgets far exceeding the budgets of many 
developing countries.17  Foreign investors often have economic muscle that can 
hardly be surpassed by many host States.18  Already in mid-1990s, of the 100 
largest economies in the world, 51 are now global corporations, and only 49 are 
countries.19  It must be noted, however, that only States have a monopoly on using 
force and on regulating the activities of all economic actors in their own territory.  
It appears that an unfair asymmetry would arise if the claimant can sue the 
host State for breaches arising out of contracts while the State may not do the 
same. As the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan put it:  
 
‘[i]t would be inequitable if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID 
jurisdiction, the [foreign investor] could on the one hand elevate its side of 
the dispute to international adjudication and, on the other, preclude the [host 
State] from pursuing its own claim for damages [...]’.20   
 
To sum up, counterclaims are supposed to facilitate procedural equality of the 
parties, enhance efficiency of dispute resolution, and improve enforcement 
prospects.  Host States can now assert counterclaims against investors under all 
major arbitration rules.21  Most notably, counterclaims have been asserted at the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), at ICSID, and under UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.  Despite the view expressed in the literature that counterclaims always fail,22 
the next sections show that this is not always the case.  
 
 
                                                     
15 G. Laborde, ‘The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration’ (2010) 1 Journal of International 
Dispute Resolution 97, 110. 
16 K.H. Boeckstiegel, ‘Enterprise v State: the New David and Goliath?’ (2007) 23 Arbitration International 
93, 94. 
17 See A.C. Habbard, ‘The Integration of Human Rights in Corporate Principles in The Integration of 
Human Rights in Corporate Principles’ in OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Annual 
Report (Paris: OECD, 2001), 99. 
18 Boeckstiegel, n 16 above.  
19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 1995 (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 1996). 
20 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
Procedural Order No. 2, 16 October 2002, 302. 
21 See, eg, ICSID Arbitration Rule 40 and the ICSID Convention, n 12 above, Art 46; UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Art 19.3; Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 1999 Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, Art 10.3; 1998 International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, Art 5(5).  
22 A. Vohryzek-Griest, ‘State Counterclaims in Investor-State Disputes: A History of 30 Years of Failure’ 
(2009) 15 International Law, Revista Colombiana De Derecho Internacional 83, 84: ‘State counterclaims in 
investor-State disputes always fail.’ 
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IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
 
So far the largest number of counterclaims asserted by States was under the rules 
of the IUSCT.  The IUSCT was established under an understanding known as the 
Algiers Accords of January 19, 1981.23  It resolved claims by United States 
nationals for compensation for nationalisations by the Iranian government, claims 
by the governments against each other, and counterclaims of States against 
investors.  The Claims Settlement Declaration, which constitutes the basis of the 
IUSCT jurisdiction, provides that the Tribunal was 
 
[…] established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United 
States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, 
and any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or 
occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim [...].24  
 
The IUSCT jurisprudence suggests that jurisdiction over a counterclaim depends 
entirely on the presence of jurisdiction over the claim.25  If jurisdiction over the 
claim fails, related counterclaims should also be dismissed.  However, if the 
tribunal asserted its jurisdiction over the counterclaim it can stand alone, even if 
the main claim has been withdrawn.26  Because IUSCT jurisdiction is defined in 
rather broad terms, thousands of counterclaims have been filed at the IUSCT.27  
They included counterclaims for advance payments, breach of contract, services 
rendered, defective products, and other categories.28  All these counterclaims arose 
out of investors’ contractual obligations. 
 
ICSID CONVENTION  
 
The ICSID Convention adopted in 1966 established the capacity of private entities 
to submit claims against States without intervention of their respective national 
governments.29  The ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules provide 
for jurisdiction over counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the 
dispute and within the scope of consent of the parties.30  Article 46 of the ICSID 
Convention provides:  
 
                                                     
23 See, generally, C.N. Brower and J.D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
24 Claims Settlement Declaration, Art II, para 1, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9. 
25 See, eg, Phillips Petroleum Company Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 435-39-2 (29 June 1989), 
reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 146-48. 
26 ibid.  
27 Brower and Brueschke, n 23 above, 99. 
28 ibid. 
29 Y. Kryvoi, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2010), 26-30. 
30 ICSID Convention, n 12 above, Art 46; ICSID Arbitration Rule 46.  
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Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a 
party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising 
directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within 
the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.  
 
The ICSID Convention’s drafting history suggests that the reason for inclusion of 
counterclaims was to eliminate the necessity to start new proceedings.31  It was 
emphasised in the course of drafting that counterclaims should be covered by 
consent of the parties and cannot go beyond the tribunal’s competence.32  
According to the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, the 
Convention is meant to be equally adapted to the requirements of institution of 
proceedings by investors as well as by host States.33   
Until now, most counterclaims by States against foreign investors asserted 
under ICSID rules were for costs arising out of non-ICSID proceedings,34 interest 
payment,35 or taxes36.  In majority of ICSID cases where tribunals asserted 
jurisdiction over counterclaims, subsequently they were denied on the merits.37  In 
other cases tribunals agreed with counterclaims asserted by States.38  
 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 
 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were originally adopted in 1976 and most 
recently revised in 2010.39  They provide for a set of rules for an ad hoc arbitration 
and are commonly used in investor-State disputes.  Until recently, the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provided that the respondent can bring a 
                                                     
31 Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, (Washington: World 
Bank, 2001), 270. 
32 ibid, 270, 337, 422.  
33 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (18 March 1965), para 13. 
34 See eg Maritime International Nominees Establishment v Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, 
Award of 6 January 1988, (1997) 4 ICSID Reports 61, 77. 
35 Benvenuti & Bonfant v Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award of 15 August 1980, (1993) 1 ICSID 
Reports 330, 342, para 3.5. 
36 Amco v Indonesia, Resubmitted Case, Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 May 1988, (1993) 1 ICSID Reports 
562, 562-564. 
37 See eg Klöckner v Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award of 21 October 1983, (1994) 2 ICSID 
Reports 9, 16; Alex Genin v Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award of June 25, 2001, (2002) 
17  ICSID Rev. FILJ 395, paras 196-201; S.A.R.L. Benvenuti and Bofant v The People’s Republic of Congo, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award of 8 August 1980, (1982) 21 ILM 1478, paras 4.95-4.96; Adriano 
Gardella spa v Republic of the Ivory Coast, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1, Award of 29 August 1977; Southern 
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 27 November 1985. 
38 See eg Maritime International Nominees Establishment v Republic of Guinea, n 34 above (counterclaims dealt 
with recovery of legal expenses that the government incurred because of the investor's non-compliance 
with the tribunal's recommendation).  
39 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
1976Arbitration_rules.html>. 
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counterclaim ‘arising out of the same contract’.40  That rule was amended in 2010.  
Currently, Article 21.3 of the Rules provides as follows: 
 
In its Statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the 
arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under the circumstances, 
the respondent may make a counterclaim or rely on a claim for the purpose 
of a set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over it. 
 
Counterclaims in UNCITRAL investor-state disputes have been rare, which is a 
consequence of a rather narrow scope of jurisdiction of investment tribunals 
under the old version of the rules.41  The requirement that a dispute should arise 
out of the same contract was completely inappropriate in the context of investor-
state disputes.42  Since the Rules’ revision in 2010, more counterclaims are likely to 
be asserted by States.  
More liberal rules on counterclaims may change investors’ preferences in 
choosing forum for arbitration. It may motivate them to choose arbitration rules 
less favourable to counterclaims. The revised UNCITRAL rules on jurisdiction 
over counterclaims appear to be less restrictive compared to ICSID rules. 
As this review of major arbitration rules suggests, investor-state tribunals can 
assert jurisdiction over counterclaims.  But because most BITs do not provide for 
any obligations of foreign investors and are generally concluded for the benefit of 
foreign investors, a legitimate question is whether investors consent to such 
counterclaims when they initiate arbitral proceedings. 
 
 
 
III CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS 
 
PURPOSE OF BITS AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
 
Historically, the main aim of investment treaties and contracts was to moderate 
the exercise of sovereign power by host States.  The idea is that it is the conduct of 
States, rather than the conduct of investors, which needs to be kept in check.43  
Most treaties explicitly provide that their main goal is to protect investors and 
facilitate foreign investments.44  An important aim of investment treaties and 
                                                     
40 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976 edition), Art 19(3).  
41 See eg Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech 
Republic’s Counterclaim of 7 May 2004, paras 78-79; Zeevi Holdings v Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
of 25 October 2006. 
42 See J. Paulsson and G. Petrochilos, ‘Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ at 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf>. 
43 G. Laborde, n 15 above, 98.  
44  See eg Preamble to the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Promotion and 
  
Yaraslau Kryvoi                                              Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration 
 9 
contracts is to moderate the exercise of sovereign power by host States.45  Some 
even dubbed investment arbitration as an ‘international quasi-judicial review of 
national regulatory action’.46 
BITs or investment protection legislation, which contain arbitration clauses, 
effectively serve as a unilateral offer of jurisdiction to investors.  Investor's 
acceptance of such offer defines the scope of the tribunal's subject matter 
jurisdiction both over primary claims and counterclaims.  Consent remains a 
cornerstone of the system of international adjudication in general47 and investor-
State arbitration in particular.   
In practice, most BITs only enable the investor, rather than the State, to 
submit claims to ICSID.48 Under international treaties, investors are privileged and 
‘traditionally being afforded rights without being subject to obligations’.49  
Investors’ legal position under BITs can be compared to third party beneficiaries 
in contracts – they have rights under BITs but not obligations.50  The purpose of 
BITs and similar instruments is to encourage investments and protect investors’ 
rights.  Similarly, BITs neither provide for the procedure for submission of State’s 
counterclaims nor even mention the right of investor to submit counter-claims.51  
As all international treaties, BITs are supposed to be interpreted in the light of 
their object and purpose.52  In the absence of any specific language in BITs 
providing for a possibility of counterclaims against foreign investors, allowing 
such counterclaims may seem problematic. 
If the investor limited its acceptance of jurisdiction to claims based on the 
treaty, should only the treaty be the source of rights and obligations over which 
the tribunal can assert jurisdiction?  To answer this question, it is important to 
understand that the BIT itself is not the basis for the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
Suggesting otherwise would mean that any award rendered under such agreement 
would be impossible to enforce under the New York Convention.53   
When a State enters into a BIT, it extends a standing offer to eligible 
investors to arbitrate any relevant investment dispute through international 
arbitration.  If the investor chooses to accept the offer, it usually does so by 
                                                                                                                                       
Protection of Investments, 23 November 1995 (‘desiring to create favourable conditions for greater 
investment by nationals and companies of one State in the territory of the other State’).  
45 Laborde, n 15 above. 
46 H.E. Veenstra-Kjos, ‘Counter-claims by Host States in Investment Dispute Arbitration “Without 
Privity”’ in P. Kahn and T. Waelde (eds), New Aspects Of International Investment Law (2004), 597, 600.  
47 E. Lauterpacht, Aspects of Administration of International Justice (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 
1991), 23.  
48 See eg the Romania-Greece BIT, Art 9(2).  
49 M. Jacob, ‘International Investment Agreements and Human Rights’ (INEF Research Paper Series 
03/2010, 2010), 21. 
50 Laborde, n 15 above, 112.  
51 ibid.  
52 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art 31.1, ‘[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
53 ibid, 3: ‘If the agreement to arbitrate was a treaty, the resulting award would not be enforceable under 
the New York Convention of 1958, which has no application to international law arbitrations, e.g. 
between States or other international legal persons.’ 
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initiating arbitration proceedings, thereby perfecting the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate the investment dispute.   Investor’s consent to arbitration is manifested in 
an agreement to arbitrate a claim under the BIT.  Such consent usually constitutes 
a separate written contract, which typically incorporates by reference a certain set 
of arbitration rules, which the parties agree to apply in full.  If the arbitration rules 
include the procedural right to submit counterclaims, the parties are bound by it.54 
As explained above, the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and 
other arbitration rules explicitly provide for the right to assert counterclaims.   
Moreover, in a number of cases States themselves initiated ICSID 
proceedings against investors under BITs,55 which makes submission of 
counterclaims a less controversial issue. The vast majority of BITs in investor-
State disputes mentioned above did not contain any provisions regarding 
counterclaims and had a sufficiently generic dispute resolution clause.  Tribunals 
asserted their jurisdiction over counterclaims in the absence of such provisions 
based on the agreed set of procedural rules and the applicable law.  
In this context it is useful to compare two cases, which involved 
counterclaims under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules but had different treaty 
provisions regarding resolution of disputes.  In AMTO v Ukraine, the dispute was 
invoked on the basis of the Energy Charter and Treaty the Rules of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).56  The 
Energy Charter Treaty contains no mentioning of the right to counterclaim while 
the SCC rules do.  The State asserted a counterclaim for non-material injury to its 
reputation.57  The tribunal ruled that counterclaims were outside of its jurisdiction 
because the State failed to specify the basis for its counterclaim in applicable law.58  
The tribunal explained that:  
 
[…] the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal over a State Party counterclaim 
under an investment treaty depends upon the terms of the dispute resolution 
provision of the treaty, the nature of the counterclaim and the relationship of 
the counterclaims with the claims in arbitration.59  
 
In this case, provisions of a relevant treaty limited its offer of jurisdiction to 
disputes over violations of obligations stipulated in the Energy Charter Treaty 
itself.  In particular, Article 26 of the Energy Charter only covers the following 
category of disputes: ‘Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of 
                                                     
54 See also P. Karrer, ‘Jurisdiction on Set-Off Defenses and Counterclaims’ (2001) 67(2) Arbitration 176, 
177: ‘an arbitral tribunal should have jurisdiction over counterclaims between the same parties, even if 
these counterclaims are not covered by the arbitration agreement which confers jurisdiction on the 
arbitral tribunal over the main claim [...]’.  
55 Laborde, n 15 above, 100.  
56 AMTO LLC v Ukraine, Final Award, SCC Case No 080/2005, IIC 364 (2009). 
57 ibid, 116-118.  
58 ibid, 118.  
59 ibid.  
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another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the 
former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part 
III [of the Energy Charter]..’ 
Because the State’s claim did not arise out of substantive obligations provided 
by the Energy Charter, the tribunal in AMCO v Ukraine decided it could not go 
beyond its subject matter jurisdiction and declined to assert jurisdiction over the 
claim.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may also present 
the same problem because the dispute settlement clause there is limited to 
obligations under specified articles of NAFTA.60  
Had the relevant treaty covered a wider category of disputes or provided for 
investors’ obligations the outcome would be different.  In another UNCITRAL 
arbitration, Saluka v Czech Republic, the dispute resolution clause of the relevant 
BIT covered ‘[‘a]ll disputes between one Contracting Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter’61.  The tribunal 
explained: 
 
[t]he language of Article 8, in referring to ‘All disputes,’ is wide enough to 
include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, of course, as other 
relevant requirements are also met. The need for a dispute, if it is to fall 
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, to be ‘between one Contracting Party and 
an investor of the other Contracting Party’ carries with it no implication that 
Article 8 applies only to disputes in which it is an investor, which initiates 
claims.62 
 
Saluka and AMTO are UNCITRAL cases which demonstrate that if the relevant 
BIT dispute provision is broad enough and is not limited to obligations specifically 
provided by the BIT, it is possible to assert counterclaims against investors.  
However, not all investors’ obligations fall under subject matter jurisdiction of 
investor-state tribunals as explained below.  
 
SUBJECT MATTER OF COUNTERCLAIMS 
 
As demonstrated above, all major arbitration rules require that counterclaims 
relate to the substance of the already initiated dispute.  Under IUSCT rules 
counterclaims should relate to the subject matter of the main claim.  ICSID Rules 
require that counterclaims arise ‘directly out of the subject matter of the dispute’.  
Under ICSID Rules, the counterclaim may relate to the main substance of the 
dispute or may be an incidental or additional claim.63  The revised UNCITRAL 
                                                     
60 Under the NAFTA, Arts 1116 and 1117, the only claims which may be submitted to arbitration are 
claims that another NAFTA Party has breached an obligation under specified articles of Chapter 11. 
61  The Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic dated 9 April 1991, Art 8.  
62 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, n 41 above, para 39. 
63 See Note A to Arbitration Rule 40 of 1968, (1968) 1 ICSID Reports 100.  
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Arbitration rules simply state that counterclaims should be within the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.  Typically counterclaims have defensive nature and purport to 
undermine the primary claim.64 
In the majority of cases in which counterclaims were presented, they related 
to the main substance of the case and were not of an incidental nature.65  
Investment protection treaties primarily deal with commercial obligations and 
usually do not go beyond that.  
Only a few treaties provide for a general commitment to human rights and 
protection of labour rights.66  The 2004 US Model BIT acknowledged that it is 
‘inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing the protections 
afforded to domestic environmental or labour laws’.67  A number of treaties 
concluded between the United States and Latin American countries recognise 
‘respect for internationally recognized worker rights’.68 In practice these provisions 
serve merely as declarations deprived of any specific content.  
The ICSID case Biloune v Ghana69 can further illustrate this point.  The 
tribunal rejected recovery for moral damages claimed for violation of human rights 
resulting from arbitrary detention and unlawful forceful deportation of an 
investor.  It ruled that deciding on human rights violations was outside its 
jurisdiction: 
 
[t]he Government agreed to arbitrate only disputes ‘in respect of the foreign 
investment.’  Thus, other matters – however compelling the claim or 
wrongful the alleged act – are outside this Tribunal’s jurisdiction [...] [W]hile 
the acts alleged to violate the international human rights […] may be relevant 
in considering the investment dispute under arbitration, this Tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of action, a claim of violation 
of human rights.70 
 
Proposals to add a more robust human rights dimension to BITs have been 
seriously discussed recently,71 but failed to materialise into concrete legal 
                                                     
64 ibid. 
65 C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, and A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 750. 
66 See 2005 Finland-Guatemala BIT. 
67 2004 US Model BIT, Arts 12, 23. 
68 See, eg, preamble to the Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of Investment, November 14, 1991; Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, August 27, 1993. 
69 Biloune v Ghana Investments Centre, Award of 27 October 1989 and 30 June 1990, (1994) 19 Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 11, 16, para 7.  
70 ibid, para 9.  
71 L.E. Peterson, ‘Investment Treaty News’ (27 March 2008) at <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/ 
2008/itn_mar27_2008.pdf>; T. Weiler, ‘Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New 
Approach for a Different Legal Order’ (2004) 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L.Rev. 429.   
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commitments.72  Counterclaims by States for investors' misconduct in non-
commercial areas such as human rights remain uncommon and typically 
unsuccessful. Human rights violations committed by foreign investors are typically 
addressed in domestic courts or special international human rights bodies.73  
Therefore, under all major arbitration rules the subject matter of counterclaims 
should be related to commercial aspects of foreign investment.    
 
COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST AFFILIATED COMPANIES 
 
Another issue related to consent to counterclaims is whether foreign investors 
consent to counterclaims against affiliated parties such as their parent companies.  
This is particularly important when the formal claimant in arbitral proceedings has 
insufficient assets in the host jurisdiction because local subsidiaries are distinct 
corporate entities, and their parent companies are protected from the subsidiaries’ 
obligations by the principle of limited liability.  In practice, these local subsidiaries 
could be undercapitalised and unable to pay any award rendered against them.  It 
may be difficult, if at all possible, to make a parent company with deeper pockets a 
party to arbitral proceedings.74 
On the other hand, it is easier to submit a claim against the State party than 
investor’s parent company. This is yet another manifestation of pro-investor 
asymmetry of investor-State arbitration. When a contract is signed by a State-
affiliated entity, claimants might try to extend the clause to the State itself.  
According to the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, 
an entity whose structure, function, and control flow from governmental 
authority, as well as conduct of persons empowered by the State to ‘exercise 
elements of governmental authority’ are considered the conduct of the State 
‘provided that the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular 
instance’.75  It is more difficult for State to counterclaim against corporations 
which have not signed the arbitration agreement.  
A good example of extending subject matter jurisdiction over non-signatories 
is Klöckner v Cameroon, where the tribunal asserted its jurisdiction and allowed a 
counter-claim, which involved a locally incorporated subsidiary.76  The 
government of Cameroon signed several agreements with the claimant and its 
domestically incorporated company, which provided for ICSID arbitration of 
disputes.  When the issue of counterclaims against a locally incorporated company 
                                                     
72 See discussion of the draft 2007 Norwegian Model BIT in ‘Norway Proposes Significant Reforms to its 
Investment Treaty Practices’ (2008 March) Investment Treaty News at <http://www.iisd.org/ 
itn/2008/page/4/>.  
73 Usually without much success because of principles of forum non conveniens and corporate limited 
liability. See Y. Kryvoi, ‘Enforcing Labor Rights against Multinationals in Europe’ (2007) 46 Industrial 
Relations 366. 
74 For a more detailed discussion of piercing the corporate veil, see Y. Kryvoi, ‘Piercing the Corporate 
Veil in International Arbitration’ (2010) 1 Global Business Law Review 169.  
75 International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, Art 5. 
76 Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award of 21 October 1983, (1994) 2 ICSID Rep. 9, 16. 
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arose, the arbitrators focused on questions of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
contract to allow counterclaims, rather than personal jurisdiction over a non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement.    
The Klöckner tribunal explained that the question arising in this case is not 
whether the tribunal has ‘ratione personae’ jurisdiction over the locally incorporated 
company. 77  The question was whether it had jurisdiction ‘ratione materiae’ on the 
application and interpretation of the Establishment Agreement.78  The tribunal 
concluded that the contracts entered into by a local subsidiary establish the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal with respect to the counterclaim because of the direct 
connection between the contracts and the parties' claims.79 
In a UNCITRAL case Saluka v Czech Republic, the claimant contended that the 
tribunal had no personal jurisdiction over the entity against which the State 
asserted counterclaim, because that entity had never consented to be a party to the 
arbitration.80  The State argued that if the locally incorporated entity was permitted 
to represent the interests of the foreign parent company in arbitration, a 
counterclaim could be asserted against the foreign company.81  The State asked the 
tribunal to pierce the corporate veil and treat both companies as the same single 
group of companies, and redress abuse of corporate form.82   
The Saluka tribunal refrained from ruling on the issue of piercing the 
corporate veil and proceeded on the assumption that ‘the relationship between 
[the affiliated parties] is sufficiently close to enable the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 
proceedings instituted by [the local subsidiary] to extend its claims against [the 
parent company]’.83 It held that it did not have jurisdiction for two reasons – 
because of the absence of close connection between the primary claim and a 
counterclaim and because there was a special dispute resolution procedure 
established for the issues contested in the counterclaim.84   
Tribunals are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in counterclaims context.  
Consent to arbitration is fundamental not only for arbitral proceedings but also for 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  Even if a tribunal decides to assert jurisdiction 
over affiliated companies, the party enforcing the resulting award may face serious 
challenges. Decision on asserting jurisdiction over counterclaims can be challenged 
as falling outside of the tribunal's jurisdiction.  Enforcing awards against parent 
companies located in other countries in the absence of their consent requires 
piercing the corporate veil, which is problematic under applicable arbitration rules, 
relevant domestic law, or the New York Convention.  
                                                     
77 ibid, 17-18 (1993). 
78 ibid.  
79 ibid., 8. 
80 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, n 41 above.  
81 para 29.  
82 ibid.  
83 para 44.  
84 paras 47-82.  
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Unlike national courts, arbitration tribunals do not have enforcement 
mechanisms of their own and need to resort to national courts.  The application of 
corporate veil piercing in international arbitration is dependent upon domestic 
courts’ recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards.85  Enforcing awards 
piercing the corporate veil in domestic courts may become a very difficult task.86  
The only exception would be awards under the ICSID Convention, which 
provides for a self-contained enforcement procedure.87  
It should be noted, that ICSID pierced the corporate veil of investors in the 
past by looking into the issue of foreign control over local subsidiaries.88  Another 
approach was to pierce the veil on the basis of interpretation of the concept of 
‘investment’ in accordance with the intent of parties to the arbitration agreement 
or purpose of an international treaty.89  There is little doubt that investor-state 
tribunals may take these approaches also in the context of counterclaims.  In many 
situations, counterclaims may become an effective remedy to address investors’ 
misconduct only if arbitral tribunals and relevant domestic law allow piercing the 
corporate veil of locally incorporated subsidiaries to reach assets of their parent 
companies.   
The next section will analyse in more detail whether foreign investors have 
not only rights but also international obligations vis-à-vis host States.  
 
 
 
IV SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS OF INVESTORS IN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTES 
 
INVESTORS AS BEARERS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
According to the traditional doctrine of international law, only States, not 
individuals, are the subjects of obligation and responsibility in international law.90  
Until the second half of the Twentieth Century, the dominant principle of 
international law was that a wrong done to a national of one State, for which 
another State was intentionally responsible, was actionable not by the injured 
national, but by his State.  The only option available to foreign investors was 
invoking diplomatic protection of their home State to support their case and to 
initiate proceedings before an international tribunal.91  The investors were unable 
to proceed with an international claim against a foreign government directly.   
Over the recent decades the legal status of investors in international law has 
shifted from this classical position.  Now foreign investors can bear certain 
                                                     
85 See more about enforcement problems at Kryvoi, n 74 above.  
86 ibid.  
87 ICSID Convention, n 12 above, Art 54.1. 
88 Kryvoi, n 74 above. 
89 ibid.  
90 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1966), 194. 
91 Kryvoi, n 29 above, 27.  
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international rights and obligations.92  Norms of international law can determine 
that an individual by his own conduct may commit an international tort.93  One of 
earliest examples of individual’s civil responsibility is the International Convention 
for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, which provided for an 
obligation to pay for the cost of repair of submarine cables.94  In the past, 
examples included piracy, breach of blockade, and carriage of contraband, or acts 
of illegitimate warfare.95   
The right of investors to have recourse against States by using institutions 
such as ICSID and the IUSCT was a significant advance of the status of 
individuals and corporations under international law. That was a step forward 
compared to claims commissions which States used to resole investors’ 
grievances.96  Clearly, individual investors became subjects of international rights 
because they have competence to initiate an action against a State before a tribunal 
the jurisdiction of which the State is obliged to recognise.97   
In theory, subjects of international law are ‘persons to whom international 
law attributes rights and duties directly and not through the medium of their 
States’.98  In the investor-State context, the sole arbitrator Texaco v Libya explained 
that 'for the purposes of interpretation and performance of the contract, it should 
be recognized that a private contracting party has specific international 
capacities'.99 It is indisputable that today foreign investors – be they corporations 
or individuals – have certain direct rights.  As discussed below, international law 
also imposes certain obligations on foreign investors, attributable not through the 
medium of States. 
In determining the source of investor's obligations the arbitral tribunals are 
governed by provisions of applicable law agreed by the parties. Under 
UNCITRAL Rules, if the parties fail to agree on the applicable law the tribunal 
will apply the law which it determines to be appropriate.100  The tribunal also shall 
take into account the contract provisions and any usage of trade applicable to the 
transaction.101  ICC Arbitration Rules also follow a similar approach.102  Article 
                                                     
92 See Lauterpacht, n 47 above, 70-72; The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, J. Ruggie: ‘Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts’, delivered to the Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (9 February 2007).   
93 Kelsen, n 90 above, 203. 
94 See the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables (14 March 1884), 
Art IV. 
95 ibid, 203-207.  
96 For instance, Conciliation Commission established pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947; 
Property Commissions established pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951.  
97 Kelsen, n 90 above, 232.  
98 M. St. Korowicz, ‘The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals’ (1956) 50 Am. J. Int’l. L. 
533, 535.  
99 Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v Libya (1978) 17 ILM 1, 
13. 
100 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art 35.1. 
101 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art 35.3. 
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42.1 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that in such a situation the law of the 
host State and applicable international law come into play.  
As a practical matter, in the absence of specific choice of law in BITs, 
investor-state tribunals usually apply international law, including provisions of a 
relevant BIT and the host State law.103  In certain circumstances, tribunals may 
also look for rights and obligations of the parties in contracts.  Each of these 
sources of obligations is discussed in more detail below.   
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Relevant sources of international law 
In some cases BITs refer both to domestic law and international law as applicable 
law.104  The parties may even exclude domestic law altogether and apply only 
international law.  For instance, NAFTA105 and the Energy Charter Treaty106 
provide for international law as a sole source of the applicable law.    
However, most BITs contain no provisions on the issue of applicable law.107 
According to Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, if the parties have not reached 
an agreement on the rules of the international law, the Tribunal – in addition to 
the law of a State Party to the dispute – applies ‘such rules of international law as 
may be applicable’. International law remains applicable in ICSID proceedings 
unless the parties have explicitly excluded it.   A number of ICSID tribunals 
explained that international law remains applicable in ICSID proceedings unless 
the parties have specifically excluded its application.108  If domestic law is chosen 
as applicable law of the dispute, international law plays a supplemental and 
corrective function in relation to the domestic law.109  It means that international 
law fills the gaps in the host State's laws; in case of its conflict with the domestic 
law, international law prevails.110  Many international tribunals followed this 
approach in their decisions.111  In other words, international law prevails over any 
conflicting domestic rules of law.112 
                                                                                                                                       
102 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules, Art 17.1. 
103 A. Parra, ‘Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration’ in A. Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in 
International Arbitration and Mediation (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 
104 T. Begic, Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 
2005), 232. 
105 NAFTA, Art 1131. 
106 Energy Charter Treaty, 1991, Art 26. 
107 Parra, n 103 above, 7-8.  
108 See, eg, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 14 July 2006, 
para 86; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 
Award of 20 May 1992, (1995) 3 ICSID Reports 131, 189, para 84; Amco v Indonesia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case, Award of 5 June 1990, (1993) 1 ICSID Reports 413, 580. 
109 History of the Convention, n 31 above, 570-571, 985-986.  
110 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States’ (1972) 2 Recueil des Cours 136; Begic, n 104 above, 155.   
111 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v Libya, Award of 19 January 1977, 
(1978) 17 ILM 1, 11; Kloeckner v Cameroon, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, (1986) 1 ICSID Review 
- FJIL 89, 112.  
112 See discussion of cases dealing with this issue in Begic, n 104 above, 155-164.  
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Where can international law rules be found? Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides a classical definition of sources of 
international law:  
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law. 
 
The Report of ICSID Executive Directors clarifies that the term ‘international law’ 
has the same meaning as Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice with allowance being made that Article 38 was designed to apply to inter-
State disputes.113  Indeed, proceedings of the International Court of Justice are 
based on State sovereignty. Investor-State disputes are different because of formal 
equality of private investor and State.  Therefore, principles of interpretation used 
in general international law may be irrelevant for investor-State disputes. 
Therefore, general international law should be applied differently in the context of 
international investment law, which constitutes a self-contained legal regime. Even 
in relations between States various sources of international law play different roles 
within self-contained legal regimes. Investor-State arbitration is regulated by a self-
contained regime within international law.  
In a broader sense, self-contained regimes are interrelated wholes of primary 
and secondary rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it 
would be covered under general law.114  Examples of other self-contained regimes 
include WTO law or law of diplomatic protection.115  The Commentary to Article 
A 55 of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts makes a distinction between ‘weaker forms 
of lex specialis, such as specific treaty provisions on a single point’ and ‘strong 
forms of lex specialis, including what are often referred to as self-contained 
regimes’.  
Such self-containedness interacts with international law’s contractual bias, ie 
where a matter is regulated by a treaty, there is normally no reason to have 
recourse to other sources.116  However, obligations in investor-State treaties are 
                                                     
113 Report of Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention, para 40 at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf>. 
114 ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, United Nations - Geneva 2006), 68. 
115 ibid, 65-69. 
116 ibid, 68. 
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often too general and require interpretive guidance from elsewhere. A self-
contained regime provides interpretative guidance that in some way deviates from 
the rules of general law.117  For instance, in Feldman v Mexico, a NAFTA arbitration 
tribunal found that the meaning of the term ‘expropriation’ under Article A 1110 
of the NAFTA was ‘of such generality as to be difficult to apply in specific cases’.  
The tribunal then read this term against the ‘principles of customary international 
law’ in order to apply it in the context of State action against grey market cigarette 
exports.118 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal followed a similar logic in Amoco v Iran: 
 
As a lex specialis, in relations between the two countries, the treaty 
supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law […] however 
[…] the rules of customary international law may be useful in order to fill in 
possible lacunae of the law of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of 
undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and 
implementation of its provisions.119 
 
In the past, ICSID tribunals applied other treaties, customary international law, 
and general principles of law in addition to BITs.120  
 
International conventions 
International conventions (treaties) and in particular BITs are the first and 
foremost source of international law applied by investor-State tribunals. In 
addition to BITs, multilateral treaties such as the NAFTA and the Energy Charter 
Treaty also may be relied upon and the jurisdictional basis of investor-State 
dispute. They also provide specific rights of foreign investors such as protection 
against expropriation and the right to fair and equitable treatment.  
However, treaties create obligations for parties to them, ie States.  As was 
noted in Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, legal persons lack the ability to create 
international law themselves, such as via treaty.121  Typically international treaties 
provide for States’ obligations to regulate corporations in a certain way without 
spelling out directly applicable rules.122 
                                                     
117 ibid, 70.   
118 Feldman v United Mexican States, Award of 16 December 2002, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, (2003) 
126 ILR 58, 65, para 98. 
119 Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran, (1987-II) 15 Iran-US C.T.R 222, para 112.  
120 O.K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals - An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19 European 
Journal of International Law 301, 339. 
121 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v Iran), Judgment of July 22nd, 1952, (1952) I.C.J. Rep. 93, 
98 at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/16/1997.pdf>. 
122 See, eg, Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (requiring the establishment of legal person liability 
under national law for bribery as well as embezzlement and misappropriation of property); the Global 
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Can treaties impose obligations on investors who are not parties to 
investment treaties?  If treaties were treated as a regular contract,  then no 
obligations can be imposed on third parties, only rights. It is a universally accepted 
principle of contract law that a third party cannot be subjected to a burden by a 
contract to which it is not a party.123  
A number of developing countries advocate for inclusion of investors’ 
obligations directly in international investment agreements. In 2002 China, Cuba, 
India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe proposed that any discussion in the WTO 
on a multilateral framework on trade and investment should also look at legally 
binding measures aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility and accountability 
relating to foreign investors.124  In particular, they insisted on including both 
investors’ obligations and the obligations of their home governments and spelling 
out such obligations as the need to comply with all domestic laws and regulations 
in each and every aspect of the economic and social life of the host members in 
their activities.  
However, it appears that investors are already under obligation to abide by 
domestic laws of the State in which they operate. This is a consequence not only 
of domestic law requirements, but also the international law principle of territorial 
sovereignty.125  The host State as a sovereign actor can react to investor's 
misconduct by unilaterally imposing sanctions enforcing them against the assets of 
the investment project. This is the power the host State already possesses and that 
the foreign investor lacks.126  Although this principle is sometimes spelled out in 
international agreements,127 it applies by virtue off international public law in any 
event.128  
Tribunals also rely on investors’ obligations outside of investment treaties.129  
For instance, tribunals frequently apply the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties when they interpret investment treaties.130  Parties in the past also invoked 
                                                     
123 See, eg, E. McKendrick, Contract Law (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 133.  
124 See WTO, ‘Communication from China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan and Zimbabwe: Investors’ and 
Home Governments’ Obligations’, WT/WGTI/W/152, 19 November 2002. 
125 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 105-107.  
126 Brower and Schill, n 10 above, 482.  There are also situations in which investors do not keep sufficient 
assets in the host States, which prevents this mechanism from working effectively. 
127 See, eg, the 1998 Framework Agreement for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (allowing 
Member States to undertake any measures necessary to protect national security, public morals, the 
prevention of fraud or deceptive practices, and to ensure compliance with their tax obligations in the host 
jurisdiction.) 
128 ibid. 
129 A. Wythes, ‘Investor-State Arbitrations: Can the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Clause Consider 
International Human Rights Obligations?’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 241, 253. 
130 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction 
of 8 February 2005, (2005), 44 ILM 721, paras 117, 147-165; Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005, para 141 at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org>; Camuzzi v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005, para 133; 
Noble Ventures, Inc. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award of 12 October 2005, para 50 at 
<italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf>; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
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human rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights 
but without much success.131   
Because BITs and other treaties usually do not provide for investors’ 
obligations, such obligations should be looked for elsewhere – in other primary 
and secondary sources of international law.  
 
International custom 
In a typical investor-State dispute arising out of BIT, a tribunal would start its 
examination with the text of a relevant treaty.  If the investor's obligations are not 
set out in those treaties, or its provisions are not sufficiently complete, the tribunal 
would refer to international custom unless the treaty refers to application of a 
different law (eg domestic law).  For instance, in ADC v Hungary, the Tribunal first 
applied the relevant BIT and then explained that consent to arbitration ‘must be 
deemed to comprise a choice for general international law, including customary 
international law, if and to the extent that it comes into play for interpreting and 
applying the provisions of the Treaty’.132 
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
international custom constitutes ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.  
Thus, there are two basic elements – the actual behaviour of States and the 
psychological or subjective belief that such behaviour is ‘law’.133  
During the course of drafting of the ICSID Convention, a number of rules of 
customary international law have been raised.  These included the obligation to act 
in good faith,134 protection against discriminatory treatment,135 the prohibition of 
measures contrary to international public policy, pacta sunt servanda, the exhaustion 
of local remedies, and rules on State succession.136  
International law prohibits a number of wrongful acts such as genocide, 
certain war crimes, slavery, and the so-called jus cogens norms. The question of 
applicability of the jus cogens norms to determine obligations of legal entities does 
not seem to be controversial because individuals and States are responsible for 
violations of such norms but not corporations.137 Moreover, corporate criminal 
                                                                                                                                       
ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction of October 21, 2005, (2005) 20 ICSID 
Rev. - FILJ 450, paras 88-93, 226, 230, 239.  
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final verdict as to legality of a set of usages to create a custom. 
134 History of the Convention, n 31 above, 570.  
135 ibid, 419.  
136 ibid, 801, 985. 
137 See for instance The I.G. Farben Trial. Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-two Others, Case No 57, The 
Judgment of the Tribunal (14 August 1947-29 July 1948) (The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol 10). 
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liability generally does not exist in international law and in most domestic legal 
systems.138 
Customary international law develops as a result of interaction between States 
and is meant to create obligations for States, not private investors.  On the other 
hand, general principles of law are helpful for determining obligations of non-State 
actors such as investors. 
 
General principles of law  
General principles of law have played a prominent role in arbitrations between 
States and foreign nationals as illustrated by the practice of the IUSCT and ICSID 
cases.139  These principles usually involve questions of a less political and more 
technical character compared to customary international law.140  Therefore, they 
are more relevant for determination of investors’ obligations.  Their main 
distinction of general principles of law from international customs is that they do 
not arise out of international public law.  Instead, they come from domestic law, 
practice of international organisations, or relations between States and private 
organisations141.  
The sole arbitrator in a non-ICSID investor-State dispute Texaco v Libya, 
explained the relevance of general principles of law when domestic Libyan law was 
chosen as applicable. He noted that that: 
 
[…] the application of the principles of [domestic] law does not have the 
effect of ruling out the application of the principles of international law, but 
quite the contrary: it simply requires us to combine the two in verifying the 
conformity of the first with the second.  
 
Consequently, the arbitrator declared that he would rely both on the principle of 
the binding force of contracts recognised by Libyan law, and on the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda, which is essential to international law.  
The principle of good faith occupies the most important position.  All 
domestic legal systems as well as the United Nations Charter recognises it.142  This 
principle comes into play in the context of the exercise of rights,143 and is 
                                                     
138 I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 3rd ed, 2007), 47. 
139 R. Lillich, ‘The Law Governing Disputes under Economic Development Agreements: Re-examining 
the Concept of Internationalisation’ in R. Lillich and C. Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the Twenty-
First Century: Towards Judicialisation and Uniformity (Irvington New York: Transnational Publishers, 1993), 
107 et seq; K. Lipstein, ‘International Arbitration between Individuals and Governments and the Conﬂict 
of Laws’ in B. Cheng and E.D. Brown (eds), Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in Honour of 
Georg Schwarzenberger  (London: Stevens & Son, 1988), 177. 
140 G. Hanessian, ‘“General Principles of Law” in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’ (1989) 27 Columbia J. 
Transnat’l L. 309, 309 et seq.  
141 ibid.  
142 United Nations Charter, Art 2(2).   
143 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: CUP, 
1953), 121. For application of the principle in ICSID context see Inceysa v El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
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otherwise described as the prohibition of malicious injury, ie the exercise of a right 
– or supposed right – for the sole purpose of causing injury to another.144  The 
principle of good faith establishes interdependence between the rights of an 
investor and its obligations.  The exercise of the right in a manner, which 
prejudices the interests of the other party, ie the State, would constitute a breach 
of the principle.  A bona fide exercise of a right would be appropriate and 
necessary rather than procuring an unfair advantage in the light of the assumed 
obligation.145   
The general principle of good faith gives rise to more specific rights such as 
good faith in the conclusion, interpretation, and performance of contracts.146 Even 
more specific principles would be interpretation against a party, which unilaterally 
drafted a contract.147 International arbitration tribunals developed increasingly 
specialised general principles of law in their case law.148 
Other examples of general principles of law applied by investor-state 
tribunals include restitutio in integrum, meaning that the damage caused should cover 
both the direct and the foreseeable prejudice,149 and an injured person’s’ duty to 
mitigate damages.150  Tribunals also applied principles of pacta sunt servanda,151 
estoppel,152 full compensation of damages resulting from a failure to fulfil 
contractual obligations,153 nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (prohibition 
from benefiting from one's own fraud),154 the exceptio non adimpleti contractus (person 
who is being sued for non-performance of contractual obligations can defend 
themselves by proving that the plaintiff did not perform their side of the 
bargain),155 unjust enrichment,156 and general principles of contract law.157  
                                                                                                                                       
ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006, para 230 et seq at <italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana 
_en_001.pdf>.   
144 ibid, 122. For application of this principle in investor-State context, see, e,g Saipem S.p.A. v People's 
Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on 
Provisional Measures of March 21, 2007, (2007) 22 ICSID Rev. - FILJ 100, paras 154-158; Waguih Elie 
George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 11 April 2007, paras 119, 125, 213 at <http://italaw.com>.  
145 ibid, 125.  
146 E. Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Leiden/Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010), 54.  
147 ibid. 
148 ibid, 54.  
149 See Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic 
Oil Co. and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Texaco v Libya), 17 ILM 1, Award on the 
Merits of 19 January 1977, paras 97-109; Amco v Indonesia I, Award on the Merits of 20 November 1984, 
(1992) 89 ILR 368, para 268.  
150 See Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/6, Award of 12 April 2002, (2005) 7 ICSID Rep. 173, para 167; Texaco v Libya, n 149 above. 
151 Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des 
Engrais, n 76 above (excerpts). 
152 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, n 108 above, 246-247; Klöckner 
Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, (1994) 2 ICSID Reports 95, 140-141. 
153 Amco v Indonesia, n 149 above.  
154 Inceysa v El Salvador, n 143 above, para 240 et seq. 
155 Klockner v Cameroon, n 37 above, 61 et seq; Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award of 23 September 2003, para 316 at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org>.   
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Tribunals may refuse to accept jurisdiction if one of those principles is 
breached. For instance, in World Duty Free v Kenya the tribunal held that as a matter 
of international public order it could not hear a case in which the investment had 
been made through corruption and bribes.158  In doing so, the tribunal went 
further than the Inceysa tribunal, finding that an investment must be lawful even 
when there is no express provision requiring so in the BIT. 
Unlike international treaties or international customary law, general principles 
of law provide for obligations of private parties.  In the absence of specific 
provisions setting out obligations of investors in international treaties, these 
principles of law appear to serve as an appropriate source of law to determine 
obligations of investors in investor-State arbitration.  
 
Jurisprudence and scholarly writings  
Some general principles of law and legal rules are codified and easy to access.159  
Others are more difficult to distinguish.  In practice, tribunals often skip the 
process of finding the ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ 
because it is difficult and time-consuming.  Instead, tribunals tend to rely on 
relevant international jurisprudence although international law does not operate on 
the basis of stare decision doctrine.  Prior ICSID awards, even those applying 
similar BIT language, do not constitute binding precedent.160  
However, many investor-State tribunals found themselves not barred, as a 
matter of principle, from considering the position taken or the opinion expressed 
by other tribunals.161  An ICSID tribunal in ADC v Hungary emphasised that 
despite their non-binding nature, the ‘cautious reliance on certain principles 
developed [in case law], as persuasive authority, may advance the body of law, 
which in turn may serve predictability in the interest of both investors and host 
States’.162  In addition to case law, investor-State tribunals often rely on scholarly 
writings to help establish norms of law.163 Therefore, international jurisprudence 
and scholarly writings can be used as subsidiary means of identifying investors’ 
obligations in investor-State disputes.  
                                                                                                                                       
156 Amco Asia Corporation and others v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case: 
Award of 5 June 1990, (1993) 1 ICSID Rep. 569, paras 154-156; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, n 108 above, paras 245–249; Inceysa v El Salvador, n 143 above, para 253 et 
seq. For a longer list of cases in which tribunals relied upon by ICSID Tribunals, see Schreuer, et al, n 65 
above, 608-609.    
157 Amco v Indonesia, n 149 above, paras 180-183.  
158 World Duty Free Company Ltd v Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 25 September 2006, para 157. 
159 See, eg, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004) at <www.unidroit.org/ 
english/principles/contracts/main.htm>.  
160 AES Corporation v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 26 
April 2005, (2007) 12 ICSID Reports 308, 317, paras 27-28.  
161 ibid.  
162 ADC Affiliate et al v The Republic of Hungary, n 132 above, para 293.  
163 For a survey of sources relied upon by investor-state tribunals, see Jeffrey Commission, ‘Precedent in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration – A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence’ (2007) 24 Journal of 
International Arbitration 129. 
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DOMESTIC LAW 
 
Often BITs provide that domestic law of the host State and international law 
govern the disputes between the State and the investor.164  According to the ICSID 
Convention, if the parties fail to agree on applicable law the law of the host State 
applies.  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as well as other institutional arbitration 
rules gives discretion to the tribunal to determine what law should apply.  
A failure to comply with the laws of the host State may even act to exclude 
the investment from protection under the BIT.  In Maffezini v Spain, the tribunal 
held that the Argentine investor’s failure comply with its environmental 
regulations constituted a violation of the investor’s obligations.165 In the 2006 case 
of Inceysa v El Salvador the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis of a BIT 
provision that the investment must be made in accordance with the law of the 
host country, holding that an investment made through fraudulent means could 
not be made in accordance with law.166   
Applicable domestic law does contemplate investors' obligations.  However, 
not all domestic law obligations rise to the level of international law obligations.  
Counterclaims arising out of application of domestic law of general applicability 
usually fall outside of international tribunals’ jurisdiction.  For instance, in a 
number of cases before the IUSCT Iran counterclaimed requesting contributions 
due for allegedly unpaid taxes and social security contributions.  The IUSCT 
tribunals usually held that the counterclaim arose not out of the same contracts 
that were subject matter of the investor's claim but out of the generally applicable 
domestic law.167  This was upheld even if the contract upon which a claim is based 
expressly allocates the burden to make such claims to the claimant.168  
A good example of an ICSID case with the same logic is Amco v Indonesia in 
which the State asserted a counterclaim seeking payment of taxes and of custom 
duties.  Those taxes and duties would have been due but for special exemptions 
granted under the investment license, which had been revoked.  The tribunal 
found against the State because the license revocation was found to be unlawful.169   
Following the award’s annulment Indonesia modified its counterclaim and 
alleged tax fraud.  Because Indonesia did not introduce it as counterclaim in 
accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rules the Tribunal considered tax fraud as a 
                                                     
164 Begic, n 104 above, 232.  
165 Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Award of 13 November 2000. 
166 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 2 August 2006 at 
<www.italaw.com>. 
167 See, eg, Petrolane, Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Iran-US Claims Tribunal Award No. 518-131-2 (14 
August 1991), para 118, 27 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 64, 104, 138; Inc. v Ministry of National Defence of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal Award No. 191-59-1 (20 September 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R. 107, 134-136. 
168 See, eg, International Technical Products Corporation and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Final 
Award No. 196-302-3 (28 October 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206, 224-226. 
169 Amco v Indonesia, n 149 above, paras 283-287.  
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new claim.170  The tribunal eventually ruled that because the claim did not arise 
‘directly out of an investment’ as required by the ICSID Convention the tax fraud 
case was outside its jurisdiction.  The tribunal also distinguished between rights 
and obligations provided by the BIT and generally applicable rights and 
obligations:  
 
It is correct to distinguish between rights and obligations that are 
applicable to legal or natural persons who are within the reach of a host 
State's jurisdiction, as a matter of general law; and rights and obligations 
that are applicable to an investor as a consequence of an investment 
agreement entered into with that host State.  
 
Legal disputes relating to the latter will fall under Article 25(1) of the 
Convention. Legal disputes concerning the former in principle fall to be 
decided by the appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless 
the general law generates an investment dispute under the Convention. 
171 
 
The same logic on arbitrability of domestic law claims in investor-State arbitration 
appeared in Saluka v Czech Republic, a dispute governed by UNCITRAL rules.172 The 
tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction because of the absence of close 
connection between the primary claim and a counterclaim.  Like in Amco v Indonesia, 
the tribunal emphasised that the counterclaims involved ‘non-compliance with the 
general law of the Czech Republic’ and ‘rights and obligations which are applicable 
as a matter of the general law of the Czech Republic, to persons subject to the 
Czech Republic’s jurisdiction’.173  The tribunal concluded that the counterclaims 
were to be decided not through the BIT settlement procedure, but through 
appropriate procedures under Czech law.174 
More recently, a UNICTRAL tribunal was asked to decide a tax counterclaim 
in Paushok v Mongolia.175 Because the claim arouse out of public law of Mongolia the 
Tribunal ruled that they were not within its jurisdiction.176 It explained its decision:  
 
[…] through the Counterclaims the Respondent seeks to extend the 
extraterritorial application and enforcement of its public  laws, and in 
particular its tax laws, to individuals or entities not subject to and not having 
                                                     
170 Amco v Indonesia, n 36 above, 562-564.  
171 ibid, paras 125-126.  
172 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, n 41 above. 
173 ibid, paras 78-79.  
174 ibid, para 79.  
175 Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v Mongolia, UNCITRAL 
(Russia/Mongolia), Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 28 April 2011 at <http://italaw.com/ 
documents/PaushokAward.pdf>. 
176 ibid, para 699.  
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accepted to submit to Mongolian public law or its courts. Thus, if the Arbitral 
Tribunal extended its jurisdiction to the Counterclaims, it would be 
acquiescing to a possible exorbitant extension of Mongolia’s legislative 
jurisdiction without any legal basis under international law to do so, since the  
generally accepted principle is the non-extraterritorial enforceability of 
national public laws and, specifically, of national tax laws.177 
 
Investment disputes that may also arise out of tort law obligations still fall under the 
jurisdictional reach of investor-State tribunals.  As was pointed out in the Amco Asia 
case, an international tort and an investment dispute were not mutually exclusive 
categories.178  However, only certain torts arising directly out of investment rather 
than out of law of general applicability can fall within the jurisdiction of ICSID 
tribunals. 
As discussed in Section IV, international tribunals cannot serve as a 
replacement for domestic courts of courts of appeals.  Generally applicable 
domestic regulations are outside of the parties’ consent to arbitration. 
It appears that counterclaim can be based on domestic law obligations of 
investors only if the same obligations were specifically mentioned in the relevant 
BIT or a similar instrument which provides for the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
Otherwise, violation of domestic law obligations is usually insufficient for an 
investor-State tribunal to extend its jurisdiction.  
 
CONTRACTS 
 
Most investor-State disputes involve one or more contracts concluded between the 
foreign investor and the State.  That could be a privatisation contract, a concession 
contract, or license agreement or other contracts.  Unlike BITs, in addition to 
obligations of States, these contracts also include concrete obligations of investors.  
Therefore, it is important to understand whether obligations of investors arising out 
of contracts can fall under the jurisdiction of investor-State tribunals.   
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and ICC arbitration rules provide that contract 
provisions should be taken into account when tribunals resolve disputes.179  The 
reason why most arbitration rules explicitly cover contractual obligations is that 
those rules were originally developed for resolution of purely contractual disputes 
between private parties.  Even the ICSID Convention was adopted primarily with 
contractual disputes in mind;; when the Convention was finalised in 1965 there were 
almost no BITs.180  
That does not mean, however, that disputes under BITs cannot cover 
contractual disputes.  It would be also wrong to suggest that any obligations in 
contracts concluded between the foreign investor and the host State automatically 
                                                     
177 ibid, para 695.  
178 Amco v Indonesia, n 36 above, 178. 
179 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art 35.3; 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules, Art 17.1. 
180 R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 82. 
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rise to international obligations arbitrable by investor-State tribunals.  As James 
Crawford pointed out, contractual jurisdiction can be invoked under any sufficiently 
broad BIT dispute resolution clause as long as three conditions are met.181  
First, the contract should be relating to an investment rather than an ordinary 
contract for supply of goods or services.182  Second, the contract should be with the 
State itself and not with a separate legal entity controlled by the State or a third 
party.183  Third, such jurisdiction may arise if the contract with the State does not 
have its own dispute resolution clause.184  The same logic applies to counterclaims.  
States can assert counterclaims arising out of investors’ contractual obligations if 
there is a sufficiently broad BIT clause, and the investment contract with the State 
does not have its own dispute resolution mechanism. 
Subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals is wider when investment treaty 
provisions guarantee the host State's observance of obligations or commitments 
entered into vis-à-vis foreign investors.  These provisions are commonly known as 
umbrella clauses.  A typical umbrella clause provides that ‘each party shall observe 
any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments’.185   
Umbrella clauses are often referred to as pacta sunt servanda clauses because 
their purpose is to ensure that contracts are respected.186  They impose a 
requirement on each contracting State to observe all investment obligations entered 
into with investors from the other contracting State.187  According to Lauterpacht, 
the effect of umbrella clauses is to ‘put [investor-State contracts] on a special plane 
in that breach of them becomes immediately a breach of convention’.188  
The precise nature and effect of umbrella clauses is uncertain.  Some 
commentators interpret them as investor’s contractual rights against ‘any 
interference which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or by 
administrative or legislative acts’.189  On the other hand, the application of this 
principle does not explain whether umbrella clauses also cover purely commercial 
contracts.190  Some tribunals consider these clauses as automatically elevating the 
                                                     
181 J. Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ (22nd Freshfields Lecture on 
International Arbitration, London, 29 November 2007), 13 at <http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/ 
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182 ibid. 
183 ibid.  
184 ibid.  
185 United States-Argentina BIT of 14 November 1991, Art 2.2. 
186 See 142-147 on history of umbrella clauses. 
187 J. Wong, ‘Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: of Breaches of Contract, Treaty 
Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment 
Disputes’ (2006) 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 135.  
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host State's breaches of contract with investors to a treaty violation.191  Other cases 
rejected this interpretation without explaining the meaning of the umbrella 
clauses.192  The main rationale in favour of the narrow interpretation of umbrella 
clauses is the concern of opening the floodgates of investment treaty arbitration to 
every contractual claim.  
In SGS v Philippines the tribunal stated that an umbrella clause signalled ‘an 
implied affirmative commitment to give effect to a contractual or statutory 
undertaking that arises from a contract between the parties’ and such a reading 
would be consistent with the BITs’ purpose, which was ‘to create and maintain 
favourable conditions for investment [...].’193  The tribunal in Enron v Argentine 
Republic194 found that the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘any obligation included 
both contractual obligations and statutory obligations undertaken with regard to 
investments.195  On the other hand, in Sempra v Argentine Republic,196 the tribunal 
distinguished between ‘ordinary commercial breaches of a contract’ and ‘treaty 
breaches’, implying that only the latter would fall under the scope of an umbrella 
clause.  In line with the reasoning in SGS v Pakistan,197 the Sempra tribunal noted 
that ‘such a distinction is necessary so as to avoid an indefinite and unjustified 
extension of the umbrella clause’.  Similarly, in Impregilo v Pakistan the Tribunal 
stated that the umbrella clause would not cover contracts entered into between the 
foreign investor and a distinct legal entity.198  
It is undesirable to extend jurisdiction of investor-State disputes over any 
contracts entered into by investors.  That would turn tribunals into courts of 
appeals, which is not the function of investor-State tribunals.  Indeed, BIT 
provisions, which provide for various substantive treaty standards, would be 
superfluous if any simple breach of a contract between the parties sufficed to bring 
the BIT into play.199 
                                                     
191 See, eg, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004, (2005) 8 ICSID Rep. 518; 
Noble Ventures, Inc. v Romania, n 130 above. 
192 See, eg, Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003, paras 164-173.  
193 SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para 116 (internal quotations omitted). 
194 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award of 
22 May 2007.  
195 ibid, para 274. See also Siemens A.G. v Argentine Republic, n 131 above, para 205: ‘In regards to the 
scope of Article 10(1), the Tribunal concurs with the submission that reference to disputes related to 
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196 Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (Argentina-United States 
BIT), Award of 28 September 2007.  
197 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
Award on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003.  
198 Impregilo S.p.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
22 April 2005.  
199 Wong, n 187 above, 136. 
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To sum up, investors’ purely contractual obligations do not fall under 
jurisdiction of investor-State tribunals in the absence of an umbrella clause.  
However, the State may assert counterclaims under a sufficiently broad BIT clause 
if the investor breached its obligations under the investment contract concluded 
with the State.  
 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The growing number of counterclaims submitted by States goes hand in hand with 
the growing number of investor-State disputes.  The recent revision of 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which broadened jurisdiction of UNCITRAL 
tribunals, is another factor which will increase the number of State counterclaims.  
If the plans to include environmental and human rights standards in BITs 
materialise, it may further extend jurisdiction of investor-State tribunals to non-
commercial disputes.  
Why states have not actively used counterclaims in international tribunals, 
despite all the benefits? Two reasons appear to be the most important. First, the 
State has inherent power to regulate foreign investment and often feels no need to 
go up to international tribunals.  Another reason is difficulty with the 
determination of investors' substantive obligations arbitrable at investor-State 
tribunals.  This makes the procedural aspects of counterclaims less concerning to 
States than the substantive.  
Because BITs usually do not provide for investors’ obligations, such 
obligations can be found in other sources of international law.  These are 
commercial obligations, which rise to the level of international obligations.  In the 
absence of concrete provisions setting out investors’ obligations in international 
treaties, general principles of law appear to be an appropriate source of 
international law to determine such obligations.  However, if the treaty contains an 
offer of jurisdiction only in relation to disputes arising out of obligations, provided 
in the treaty itself, it will be difficult for an investor-State tribunal to assert its 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
Investors’ contractual obligations do not fall under jurisdiction of investor-
State tribunals with two exceptions: First, if the tribunal is willing to give a broad 
interpretation of an umbrella clause, thus elevating contractual obligations to 
international obligations.  Second, the State may assert counterclaims under a 
sufficiently broad BIT clause if the investor breached its obligations under the 
investment contract concluded with the State. 
Finally, often success of counterclaims depends on the tribunal’s willingness 
to pierce the corporate veil of undercapitalised local subsidiaries to reach assets of 
their parent companies. 
 
